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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF
CHERYL SPIDER DECOTEAU, PETITIONER

v.

THE DISTRICT COUNTY COURT FOR THE
TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH DAKOTA

DON R. ERICKSON, WARDEN, SOUTH DAKOTA
STATE PENITENTIARY, PETITIONER

v.

JOHN LEE FEATHER, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

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BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Act of March 3, 1891, opening land within the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation to non-

Indian settlement, granted the State of South Dakota criminal and domestic relations jurisdiction over members of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe with respect to acts done on such land patented to non-Indians.[1]

TREATY AND STATUTE INVOLVED

The Treaty of February 19, 1867, 15 Stat. 505, is set forth in the Brief for Petitioner in *DeCoteau* at App. 1–6.

The pertinent provisions of the Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 989, are set forth in the Brief for Petitioner in *DeCoteau* at App. 7–15.

STATEMENT

This brief supplements the memorandum submitted in response to the Court's order of April 29, 1974, inviting the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States in *DeCoteau* v. *The District County Court,* and expresses the views of the United States in the closely related case of *Erickson* v. *Feather*; certiorari was granted in both cases on June 3, 1974.

[1] It is common ground that, since South Dakota is not a "Public Law 280 State" by original designation or subsequent election (see Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588; 18 U.S.C. 1162; 28 U.S.C. 1360), the State lacks civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians within the boundaries of a subsisting reservation, regardless of whether the acts occurred on Indian trust lands or lands patented to non-Indians. See 18 U.S.C. 1151. Accordingly, the question presented might be more simply stated as: Whether the boundaries of the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation remain as originally established by the Treaty of 1867.

1. *DECOTEAU* V. *DISTRICT COUNTY COURT* (NO. 73-1148)

In December 1971, the State of South Dakota brought dependency and neglect proceedings in the District Court for the Tenth Judicial District of South Dakota against petitioner DeCoteau, an enrolled member of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, seeking to terminate her parental authority over her minor children, Robert Lee Feather and Herbert John Spider, also enrolled members of the Tribe. The parties stipulated that all of the facts giving rise to the court's order occurred within the boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation, as established under the Treaty of February 19, 1867, *supra,* approximately half on allotted Indian land, and the other half on land patented to non-Indians (Decoteau, Pet. App. A, 2a; Pet. App. B, 9a). Both children were placed in foster homes by the county court.

On August 4, 1972, Mrs. DeCoteau moved in the county court for dismissal of the proceedings and return of her children to her on the ground that all the incidents giving rise to the proceedings involved Indians and occurred on the Reservation and that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction. The county court denied the motion.

Mrs. DeCoteau then petitioned in the South Dakota Circuit Court for the Fifth Judicial Circuit for a writ of habeas corpus. That court denied the writ (DeCoteau, Pet. App. B). While it found that Mrs. DeCoteau and the two children are enrolled members

of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe (DeCoteau, Pet. App. B, 8a), it ruled that the county court had jurisdiction to entertain the dependency and neglect proceedings because some of the alleged incidents occurred on non-Indian owned land within the original boundaries of the Reservation, and, in the court's view, "the non-Indian patented land * * * is not within Indian Country" (DeCoteau, Pet. App. B, 10a).

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed (DeCoteau, Pet. App. A). It held that the effect of the agreement between the United States and the Tribe dated December 12, 1889, and the Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 989, 1036, ratifying that agreement, was to separate from the Reservation all lands not allotted to Indians, and, because some of the incidents occurred on such land, the State courts had jurisdiction over the family relationships at issue.

2. ERICKSON V. FEATHER, ET AL. (NO. 73-1500)

The ten respondents in this case are all enrolled members of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Indian Tribe. They were all tried and convicted in the courts of South Dakota for alleged crimes committed within the Treaty boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation, but not upon trust land. At the time this suit was instituted they were incarcerated in the South Dakota State Penitentiary (Erickson, Pet. App. A, 3a). They petitioned in the United States district court in South Dakota for writs of habeas corpus on the ground that

the State of South Dakota did not have jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence them because their alleged criminal acts took place within the boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation (Erickson, Pet. 2). The district court, on stipulation that "the alleged crime was committed within the confines of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Indian Reservation but not upon trust land * * *," denied the writs (Erickson, Pet. App. B, 10a–19a).

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed (Erickson, Pet. App. A, 1a–9a). After reviewing the decisions of this Court, and its prior decisions on the effect of opening reservations to non-Indian settlement, the court stated (*id.* at 6a):

> The case before us is not unlike *Seymour* [v. *Superintendent*, 368 U.S. 351], *Mattz* [v. *Arnett*, 412 U.S. 481] and *Condon* [*United States ex rel. Condon* v. *Erickson*, 478 F. 2d 684 (C.A. 8)]. The overall climate of legislative activity concerning Indian reservations during the period from 1887 through 1910 received its primary impetus from the General Allotment Act. See *Cohen, supra* at 78–80. (§§ 11–13). The 1891 Act, by its express terms, refers to the General Allotment Act of 1887. Just as in the beforementioned three cases, the reservation here was not sold to the government outright but merely opened for settlement under the homestead laws and the 1887 general allotment plan. Allotment and homesteading do not suggest congressional purpose to terminate the reservation. *Seymour, supra.*

The Court found no evidence in the 1891 Act's legislative history of a congressional intent to do other

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than open the Reservation for non-Indian settlement (Erickson, Pet. App. A, 8a), and noted that the State Supreme Court had recently denied state jurisdiction in a similar situation in *State* v. *Molash*, 199 N.W. 2d 591. The court of appeals concluded that the boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation remain as established by treaty and the State of South Dakota had no jurisdiction to try the respondents (Erickson, Pet. App. A, 8a–9a).

3. THE RESERVATION AND THE TRIBE

The Sisseton and Wahpeton Sioux were a portion of the Sioux Nation who, in the Sioux outbreaks of 1862, did not rebel against the United States. Some "freely perilled their lives during that outbreak to rescue the residents of the Sioux reservation, and to obtain possession of white women and children made captives by the hostile bands." Others fled, "fearing the indiscriminate vengeance of the whites" (Treaty of February 19, 1867; DeCoteau, Pet. Br. App. 1).

In 1867 the United States made a treaty with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribes in which the Tribes "cede[d] to the United States the right to construct wagon-roads, railroads * * * and other such public improvements * * * across the lands claimed by said bands (including their reservation as hereinafter designated) * * *" (*id.* at 2; Art. 2). In consideration for the cessions made and services rendered by the Tribes, the United States established for these Tribes "as a permanent reservation" a triangular tract of land that became known as the Lake Traverse Reservation (*id.*

at 3; Art. 3).[2] The Treaty further provided (*id.* at 6; Art. 10):

> The chiefs and head-men located upon either of the reservations[3] set apart for said bands are authorized to adopt such rules, regulations, or laws for the security of life and property, the advancement of civilization, and the agricultural prosperity of the members of said bands upon the respective reservations, and shall have authority, under the direction of the agent, and without expense to the Government, to organize a force sufficient to carry out all such rules, regulations, or laws, and all rules and regulations for the government of said Indians, as may be prescribed by the Interior Department: *Provided*, That all rules, regulations, or laws adopted or amended by the chiefs and head-men on either reservation shall receive the sanction of the agent.

On December 12, 1889 the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux entered into an agreement with the United States providing that, in accordance with the Act of February 8,

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[2] In connection with our brief *amicus curiae* in *Antoine* v. *The State of Washington*, No. 73-717, this Term, we lodged with the Clerk copies of the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs Map, "Indian Lands and Related Facilities as of 1971." That map shows the Lake Traverse Reservation at issue here. We are supplying copies of the map to counsel herein. We have also appended to this brief a diagram showing the location of trust and tribal lands within the Reservation. This diagram is taken from a more detailed but bulky map prepared by the Bureau of Indian Affairs which we are lodging with the Clerk.

[3] Article 4 of the Treaty also established the Devil's Lake Reservation in North Dakota.

1887 (the General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388), the Tribes do (DeCoteau, Pet. Br. App. 8):

> * * * hereby cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of the reservation set apart to said bands of Indians as aforesaid remaining after the allotments and additional allotments provided for in article four of this agreement shall have been made.

The agreement also provides that, in addition to certain settlements of past claims and indemnities, the Indians shall receive $2.50 for each acre of land conveyed, to be deposited in the Treasury and used "for the education and civilization of the said bands of Indians * * * as provided in section five [of the General Allotment Act of 1887] * * *" (*id.* at 9).[4]

The ratifying Act of March 3, 1891, after reciting the Agreement in full, provides, among other things, that the land ceded by the Indians shall be—

> subject only to entry and settlement under the homestead and townsite laws of the United States, excepting the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections of said lands, which shall be reserved for common school purposes, and be subject to the laws of the State wherein located * * *. [*id.* at 15.]

[4] The Agreement provided that the money was to earn interest at 3% and be available for appropriation by Congress. The 1891 Act raised the interest rate to 5% and authorized the President, without further congressional action, to use any part of the funds for the "education and civilization" of the Tribe (*id.* at 14).

In accordance with the Act of 1891 a large amount of land within the Reservation was patented to non-Indians. A large amount also remains Indian trust land. The State Circuit Court in *DeCoteau* found as a fact (DeCoteau, Pet. App. B, 9a, finding IX):

> That lots or tracts of non-Indian patented or deeded land and lots or tracts of unpatented Indian trust land are interspersed in a crazy-quilt pattern over the entire area within the boundaries of the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation as established by the treaty of February 19, 1867.

The Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe has remained a major Indian Tribe. Its present enrolled membership is 6,010, of whom 3,200 live on or near the Lake Traverse Reservation. The Tribe has a Constitution and by-laws approved by the Secretary of the Interior. In addition to having an active tribal government, it operates, with federal assistance, its own police force (presently 14 persons) and maintains a tribal court with two judges and various other personnel.[5]

It is the position of the United States, in accord with the decision of the Eighth Circuit in *Erickson*, that the Act of March 3, 1891, did not disestablish the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation and that the State of South Dakota is without jurisdiction over the domestic affairs or alleged criminal acts of Indians arising within the boundaries of the Reservation as established by the Treaty of February 19, 1867.

[5] Information supplied by the Sisseton-Wahpeton Agency of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The essential question presented by these cases is whether the Act of March 3, 1891, by which unallotted land within the Lake Traverse Reservation was opened for settlement by non-Indians, removed that land from the Reservation. In approaching the question it is important to bear in mind that an Indian reservation does not connote total Indian or federal ownership of the land within it. It refers to a geographical area within which the legislative authority of the Tribe functions and the area within which federal rather than state criminal jurisdiction applies in matters affecting Indians.

The 1891 Act did not specifically change the boundaries of the Reservation or return land to the public domain, and its repeated references to the General Allotment Act show that Congress intended no more than to "open" the Reservation for non-Indian settlement. This Court's decisions in *Seymour* v. *Superintendent*, 368 U.S. 351, and *Mattz* v. *Arnett*, 412 U.S. 481, show that this limited purpose is consistent only with preservation of the Reservation as a jurisdictional unit. The special provisions of the Act as to the 16th and 36th sections also show that Congress did not regard the opening of the Reservation as altering its boundaries.

Subsequent administrative and legislative actions confirm that the 1891 Act did not disestablish the boundaries of the Reservation. The President, in proclaiming the availability of lands for settlement after passage of the Act, described them as "lands embraced

in said reservation" and "lands within the Lake Traverse Reservation opened to settlement" (*infra*, p. 22). And the Department of the Interior has held the boundaries of the Reservation to be unaffected by the 1891 Act. Recently Congress has authorized the Secretary of the Interior to purchase lands "within the boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation" for the use of the Tribe and has restored to the Tribe certain federal lands within the Reservation. These acts strongly affirm the continued existence of the Reservation as a unit of federal and Indian jurisdiction.

Moreover, given the scattering of trust lands throughout the Reservation, the State's position would be destructive of law and order on the Reservation. Since the State here (being a non-Public Law 280 State) can assert no jurisdiction over Indians on trust lands, federal and tribal jurisdiction over Indians everywhere within the Reservation's treaty boundaries is required for effective law enforcement.

Similarly, the Tribes' civil jurisdiction over the Reservation Indians, a basic part of tribal self-government, should not depend on the title to the lot within the Reservation where a particular act takes place. There is no reason to believe that Congress intended so to impede the Tribe's right to govern its own people. Accordingly, the judgment of the Eighth Circuit in *Erickson* should be affirmed, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Dakota in *DeCoteau* should be reversed.

ARGUMENT

I

THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1891, DID NOT ALTER THE BOUNDARIES OF THE RESERVATION AS ESTABLISHED IN THE TREATY OF FEBRUARY 19, 1867

Article 3 of the Treaty of February 19, 1867 (DeCoteau, Pet. Br. App. 3), granted the Sisseton and Wahpeton Sioux Indians a permanent Reservation with definite boundaries. Article 10 of that treaty (*id.* at 6) granted the Tribes within the Reservation the right to make their own laws and be governed by them, subject to the supervision of the United States. The basic question in this case is whether the Act of March 3, 1891, which clearly permitted non-Indian settlement within the Reservation, also altered the boundaries of the Reservation. In considering that issue we must remember that an Indian reservation does not connote total Indian or federal ownership of the land within it. It refers to a geographical area within which the legislative authority of a tribe functions. *Worcester* v. *Georgia,* 6 Pet. 515; *McClanahan* v. *Arizona State Tax Commission,* 411 U.S. 164. It also describes the area within which federal criminal jurisdiction in matters affecting Indians applies, 18 U.S.C. 1151, and the area within which services of the Bureau of Indian Affairs are primarily directed, *Morton* v. *Ruiz,* 415 U.S. 199. Accordingly, the fact that portions of the land within the Reservation are owned by non-Indians is immaterial. The controlling question is whether Congress

deliberately terminated or changed the boundaries of the Reservation by the Act of 1891.

1. THE GENERAL SCHEME OF THE 1891 ACT SUGGESTS NO CHANGE IN THE RESERVATION'S BOUNDARIES

The 1891 Act begins by ratifying and quoting in full the 1889 Agreement made between the Tribe and the United States. The Agreement, in its preamble, twice states that it is made under the authority of the Act of February 8, 1887, the General Allotment Act, and quotes from that Act the language which authorizes the President, after allotments have been made, to negotiate with Indian tribes for the sale of their unallotted lands (*DeCoteau,* Pet. App. C, 13a). The Agreement then specifically provides for the sale of the unallotted land of this Tribe *"within the limits of the reservation"* (*id.* at 14a; emphasis added), and directs that the payment shall be deposited in the Treasury, to be appropriated by Congress for the "education and civilization" of the Indians (*ibid.*). The Act of 1891 added to the agreement a further reference to the General Allotment Act (*id.* at 19a, sec. 29) and the proviso that the lands ceded shall:

> be subject only to entry and settlement under the homestead and townsite laws of the United States, excepting the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections of said lands, which shall be reserved for common school purposes, and be subject to the laws of the State wherein located. [*Id.* at 20a.] *

* The background of the negotiation of the 1889 Agreement and the enactment of the 1891 Act are exhaustively set out in the brief of respondent. In our view, essentially two points are

Several things are immediately apparent. The negotiation with the Indians, the allotments to them, and the cession made by them are expressly made under the authority of the General Allotment Act. The boundaries of the Reservation are not expressly altered and no separately described portion of the Reservation is vacated, returned to the public domain, or set aside for settlement. The government is not free to use the opened land for any purpose, but only for homesteading, townsites and school land. The tribal relationship is expressly continued and monies from the sale of the land are not distributed but are kept in trust to be appropriated by Congress or applied by order of the President for the "education and civilization" of the "bands of Indians or members thereof" (*id.* at 19a). Thus, on the face of the statute, it does not appear that Congress intended to change the boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation.

established: first, the non-Indian inhabitants of South Dakota intensely desired the opening of the Lake Traverse Reservation for settlement by non-Indians (see DeCoteau, Resp. Br., 16); second, the Tribe, which had endured four years of drought, was badly in need of money. See S. Ex. Doc. No. 66, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 19. Neither of these facts, however, in any way implies that the boundaries of the Reservation had to be or were reduced. Indeed, the only money immediately paid to the Tribe was not part of the consideration for the lands "ceded" but about $500,000 conceded to be due for scout services and a cancelled annuity. For the future, the Indians expected to have expended on their behalf the interest on the amount nominally deposited in the Treasury in "payment" for the land, approximately $80,000 annually (when the interest rate was raised to 5%).

2. THE REFERENCES TO THE GENERAL ALLOTMENT ACT SHOW THE RESERVATION WAS MAINTAINED

Both the 1889 Agreement and 1891 Act were adopted pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887. The philosophy of the latter Act was succinctly stated in *Mattz* v. *Arnett*, 412 U.S. 481, 496:

> [The General Allotment Act] permitted the President to make allotments of reservation lands to resident Indians and, with tribal consent, to sell surplus lands. Its policy was to continue the reservation system and the trust status of Indian lands, but to allot tracts to individual Indians for agriculture and grazing.

It was not the purpose of the General Allotment Act to divide reservations into a scattering of land under federal jurisdiction and a scattering under state jurisdiction. *Seymour* v. *Superintendent*, 368 U.S. 351, 357–358. Rather, as this Court stated in *Mattz, supra*, 412 U.S. at 497, quoting from *Seymour, supra:*

> "The Act did no more [in this respect] than open the way for non-Indian settlers to own land on the reservation in a manner which the Federal Government, acting as guardian and trustee for the Indians, regarded as beneficial to the development of its wards."

Nor was it the intent of the General Allotment Act to disturb tribal relations prior to the time that the trust status of allotments should be abolished. In *United States* v. *Nice*, 241 U.S. 591, 596–597, the Court stated:

> [The General Allotment Act] disclosed that the tribal relation, while ultimately to be broken

> up, was not to be dissolved by the making or taking of allotments, and subsequent legislation shows repeated instances in which the tribal relation of Indians having allotments under the act was recognized during the trust period as still continuing.

In sum, while the General Allotment Act of 1887 provided for some settlement of non-Indians within reservations, the congressional intent was to continue the reservation system and to maintain established relations with the Tribes and federal trust responsibility over the reservations until these protections were no longer necessary. The 1889 Agreement and 1891 Act were adopted in conformity with this policy and should not be held to have tacitly abolished or diminished the Reservation here in question.

3. THE ABSENCE OF LANGUAGE IN THE 1891 ACT EXPRESSLY ALTERING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE RESERVATION OR RETURNING LAND TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SHOWS THAT THE RESERVATION BOUNDARIES WERE NOT ALTERED

In *Mattz* v. *Arnett, supra,* this Court stated (412 U.S. at 504–505; footnote omitted):

> Congress [in 1892] was fully aware of the means by which termination could be effected. * * * The Court stated in *United States* v. *Celestine,* 215 U.S., at 285, that "when Congress has once established a reservation all tracts included within it remain a part of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress." A congressional determination to terminate must be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history. See *Seymour* v. *Superintendent,*

> 368 U.S. 351 (1962); *United States* v. *Nice,* 241 U.S. 591 (1916).

In a footnote, the Court gave the following examples of termination language [*Mattz, supra,* 412 U.S. at 504, n. 22]:

1. 15 Stat. 221 (1868) ("the Smith River reservation is hereby discontinued").
2. 27 Stat. 63 (1892) (* * * the North Half of the Colville Indian Reservation] "the same being a portion of the Colville Indian Reservation * * * be, and is hereby vacated and restored to the public domain").
3. 33 Stat. 218 (1904) ("the reservation lines of the said Ponca and Otoe and Missouria Indian reservations be, and the same hereby abolished").

There is no such language in the 1891 Act at issue here. The Reservation is not discontinued. A discrete portion of it is not "vacated and restored to the public domain." The reservation lines are not abolished.

Moreover, to read into the language opening unallotted lands for settlement an intent to remove them from the Reservation would inevitably create a reservation with crazy quilt boundaries, a result that both Congress (see 18 U.S.C. 1151) and this Court have reasonably sought to avoid.

4. THE USE OF THE WORD "CEDE" AND THE PAYMENT ARRANGEMENT OF THE ACT DID NOT CHANGE THE RESERVATION BOUNDARIES

a. The State argues that the provisions "ceding" the unallotted portion of the Reservation to the United States tacitly removes that land from the Reservation.

There are several reasons why this is not so. First the "cession" is not an outright return of the land to the public domain but a transfer expressly for the limited purpose of opening the land for homesteading in accordance with the General Allotment Act. Thus, though the Indians in the "cession" expressed their willingness that the government dispose of unallotted land, the government remained under a trust responsibility to dispose of it in a certain way, assumed to be in the Indians' interest as well as that of the government.

That a "cession" of unallotted land within a reservation does not of itself disestablish the reservation is supported by this Court's decision in *Ash Sheep Co.* v. *United States,* 252 U.S. 159. The question was whether the defendant had grazed its sheep on public land, which was entirely legal, or on "land belonging to any Indian or Indian tribe" in violation of R.S. 2117. The lands involved were (252 U.S. at 164):

> within the part of the Reservation as to which the Indians, in terms "ceded, granted, and relinquished" to the United States all of their "right, title and interest."

Nevertheless, the Court held that the lands remained in Indian ownership until actually sold to homesteaders because the lands were ceded to the United States only for subsequent sale (except for the 16th and 36th sections) and on conditions set forth in the Act. While, in our case, jurisdiction rather than ownership is at issue, *Ash Sheep Co.* at least indicates that the use of the word "cede" does not always imply

a termination of the Indian-federal relationship as to the land "ceded".

b. The State, however, argues (see DeCoteau, Resp. Br. 59–65) that because the Tribe was paid a "sum-certain" for the unallotted land, with the government recouping its money as the lands were sold, rather than being paid as the lands were sold to homesteaders, the conveyance to the government should be held to have removed the lands from the Reservation. We see no reason so to conclude.

The payment, realistically, was no more immediately available to the Tribe than if it had been paid only as each tract was sold. The monies stipulated as payment for the lands ceded were to be deposited in the United States Treasury, and the expectation was that only the interest on this trust fund would be expended, and then only as found necessary for the benefit of the Tribe by the President or Congress. As Congressman Call explained:

> • • • The amount is reimbursed, so that it is but a nominal appropriation. The entire amount comes back into the Treasury. It is nothing but a loan of the public credit of the United States to the accomplishment of these purposes [of the General Allotment Act] and in no respect touches the taxation upon the people of this country.
>
> Mr. President, there has been a great deal of objection found to this bill which has no just foundation. All the legislation to the bill is but the application of the existing law on the subject. [22 Cong. Rec. 3881, reprinted in DeCoteau, Resp. Br. 65].

Consequently, payment in this manner is not a reliable indication of an intent by Congress to change the boundaries of a reservation. Where the references to allotment and opening under the General Allotment Act are as specific as they are here and where, as here, there is no language even arguably disestablishing a discrete part of the Reservation, the payment scheme does not indicate disestablishment any more than would a scheme of payment as individual lots are sold to homesteaders. In either situation, the conveyance of the unallotted lands is handled by the government for the benefit of the Tribe in accordance with the General Allotment Act without thereby terminating the Reservation. Compare *Seymour* v. *Superintendent, supra,* 368 U.S. at 354–359.

5. THE PROVISION OF THE 1891 ACT REFERRING TO THE "LAWS OF THE STATE WHEREIN LOCATED" DID NOT DISESTABLISH ALL OR PART OF THE RESERVATION

The Act of 1891 provides that the land ceded shall "be subject only to entry and settlement under the homestead and townsite laws of the United States, excepting the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections of said lands, which shall be reserved for common school purposes, and be subject to the laws of the State wherein located * * *" (Decoteau, Pet. Br. App. 15). The Supreme Court of South Dakota, in *DeCoteau*, interpreted the final phase of this passage as expressly subjecting activities on all lands sold to state civil and criminal jurisdiction (DeCoteau, Pet. App. A, 5a–7a). The Eighth Circuit in *Erickson* found the language ambiguous—both as to its general meaning and as to whether it applied only to the school sections (which the court considered more plausible)

or to all land sold. It concluded that "[W]e do not read this clause as a clear indication of congressional intention to terminate the Lake Traverse Reservation" (Erickson, Pet. App. A, 6a–7a). In our view, the "laws of the state" language is simply not addressed to the question of whose law shall govern acts committed on the land in question; the purpose is, rather, to make clear that, while the unallotted land shall be open only to settlement under the federal homestead and townsite laws, an exception is made for the 16th and 36th sections which are to be used only for common school purposes and may be used or sold as permitted by state law for that purpose.

The language was necessary because the South Dakota Enabling Act did not reserve the 16th and 36th sections in Indian reservations for school purposes, and special language was needed to accomplish that purpose. See the Statement of Senator Gamble at 35 Cong. Rec. 3187 and the Statement of Congressman Burke at 38 Cong. Rec. 1423, both reproduced at DeCoteau, Resp. Br. 136–138. Indeed, if the "ceded" land had been regarded by Congress as no longer forming part of the Reservation, no such special language would have been needed to establish the 16th and 36th sections as school land.[7]

In sum, while the Act of March 3, 1891 paved the way for homesteading by non-Indians within the Lake Traverse Reservation, it did not change the bound-

[7] See Section 1 of the Act of March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 899–900, 43 U.S.C. 856, which, 4 years later, provided general authorization for state selection of school lands "within the boundaries of any Indian reservation in such state" from "surplus lands * * * purchased by the United States."

aries of the Reservation or abolish it. Thus questions of criminal and civil jurisdiction within this Reservation are determined as within any other Reservation.

II

SUBSEQUENT ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS CONFIRM THAT THE 1891 ACT DID NOT DISESTABLISH THE 1867 TREATY BOUNDARIES

a. The most important administrative interpretation of the 1891 Act is the contemporaneous proclamation of President Harrison opening the Reservation for settlement (Procl. of April 11, 1892, 27 Stat. 1017, DeCoteau, Pet. Br. App. 16–20). In that Proclamation, made after enactment of the 1891 Act and after payment to the Tribes for the land "ceded", the President consistently referred to the Reservation in the present tense and the lands opened for settlement as "lands embraced in said reservation" (DeCoteau, Pet. Br. App. 18). The Proclamation further referred the reader to "the accompanying schedule, entitled 'Schedule of lands *within the Lake Traver e Reservation opened to settlement* by proclamation of the President * * *" (*id.* at 19; emphasis added). This proclamation is important not only because it is a contemporaneous construction of the effect of the 1891 Act, but also because it was the basis on which non-Indian settlers purchased land, giving them fair warning that they were purchasing land within an Indian reservation.

Subsequent executive orders extending the trust period on allotments on April 16, 1914, and April 19, 1924, (Nos. 1916 and 3994, respectively) each refer

to the "Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands of Sioux Indians of the Lake Traverse Reservation, North and South Dakota." And in decisions and literature of the Department of the Interior after 1891 there are numerous references to land "in" or "within" the Lake Traverse Reservation. *Circular, Sisseton and Wahpeton Lands,* 14 L.D. 302; *Madella O. Wilson,* 17 L.D. 153; *Edward Parant,* 20 L.D. 53. Nothing could be clearer than the report of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Indian Agent in 1900 describing the Reservation:

> The reservation is in the northeastern part of South Dakota, occupying parts of Roberts, Day, Grant, Marshall and Codington counties and extending into Richland and Sargent counties of North Dakota. It is about 120 miles long and at the State line 42 miles wide, coming to a point near Watertown, S. Dak. * * *
>
> * * * * *
>
> There are 1,970 [allotted] pieces of land situated from one end of the reservation to the other * * *.
>
> [Annual Report, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, United States Indian Affairs Office, 385 (1900)].

See also the reference to the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in DeCoteau, Pet. Br. 42, n. 30.

Of equal importance, the exercise of trust responsibility by the United States for this Tribe, and the Tribal relationship of its members, remained intact. A decision of the Eighth Circuit in 1901, ten years after allotment and disposal of surplus land, makes this

continuing relationship clear. *Farrell* v. *United States,* 110 Fed. 942. The case concerned the application of the laws against sale of liquor to Indians to a sale to one La Framboise, a person of mixed Sioux and Caucasian ancestry. While the boundaries of the Reservation were not at issue, La Framboise's membership in the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe was. The court noted that:

> La Framboise had received his allotment and patent, and the lands within the reservation of the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Sioux Indians, to which he belonged, that had not been allotted, had been opened to settlement * * *. [*Id.* at 947.]

Nevertheless, it was found that there was continuing regulation by the Tribe of its membership and family relations and constant supervision over the Tribe by the resident federal agent:

> [The issuing of allotments] did not radically change the title to the lands reserved for [these Indians], or their need of care and education. The government held the title to their reservation in trust for them collectively before, it held the title to their allotments in trust for them individually after, the issue of the patents. There was every reason why congress should retain and exercise its power to superintend the trade with them, and none to induce it to renounce it. By the treaty of 1867 the United States agreed to appoint and maintain an agent for these Indians at Lake Traverse, and by its legislation and the rules of the interior department it made it the duty of this agent to use every endeavor to suppress the traffic in intoxicating liquors with them, to educate them, and to induce them to cultivate the soil. There has been no express abrogation of this agreement in any subsequent treaty or act of congress, and the government has continued to comply with it since the allotments as it did before. Agreements are not released or abrogated and statutes are not repealed by implication unless the subsequent agreements or laws are necessarily repugnant to those which preceded them. [*Id.* at 951.]

This evidence of the continued exercise of federal trust responsibility after the opening of the Reservation supports our conclusion that the Reservation was opened, but not dissolved. See also *United States* v. *Rickert,* 188 U.S. 432.

We have been unable to discover contemporaneous opinions of the Department of the Interior directed precisely to the jurisdictional effect of the 1891 Act. There are, however, two recent decisions, predating either of the appellate decisions under review, and rendered at a time when *DeMarrias* v. *State,* 319 F. 2d 845 (C.A. 8), overruled by the *Erickson* decision, was still intact. Both decisions, made by the Field Solicitor of the Department of the Interior in Aberdeen, South Dakota (the office which deals with this Tribe on a regular basis), sustained the continued federal and tribal authority and the commensurate lack of state jurisdiction over ~~them~~ following within the Treaty boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation (Opinions of June 9, 1972 and August 16, 1972, DeCoteau, Pet. Br. App. 21–33). Interpretation of a law by the government agency responsible to administer it is, of course,

entitled to great weight. *Udall* v. *Tallman*, 380 U.S. 1, 16. This is particularly true when the statute may affect the status of an Indian reservation and the trust responsibilities of the United States. *Seymour* v. *Superintendent, supra*, 368 U.S. at 357; *Mattz* v. *Arnett*, supra, 412 U.S. at 505.[8]

[8] South Dakota points out (DeCoteau, Rep. Br. 113–116) that the depiction of the Reservation on government maps varied considerably over the years since 1891. From 1892 to 1908 the Reservation was not shown on the maps. From 1909 to 1917 the Reservation was shown as an "open" reservation, but the 1918 map shows it as a "former" reservation. Modern maps show the Reservation simply as a "reservation." We think these differences are unimportant. The early map-makers wanted to show that the lands were no longer reserved for exclusive Indian occupancy, but were open for settlement. As this Court and Congress began to refine the jurisdictional meaning of such openings, the map makers followed suit. Indeed the meaning of the word "reservation" itself has changed over the years. In early years it seemed to have been used to mean literally land reserved for exclusive Indian use. Later, as a result of the various "opening" Acts, it came to have the broader jurisdictional meaning that it has today. The first decision of this Court to clarify the meanings of "reservation" and "Indian country" after the General Allotment Act was *United States* v. *Celestine*, 215 U.S. 278, 285–286. This process of clarification continued with enactment of 18 U.S.C. 1151 and this Court's subsequent decision in *Seymour* v. *Superintendent, supra*. Thus, as with early maps, early casual references to the Reservation as the "former reservation" (see DeCoteau, Resp. Br. 9) are of little significance; they indicate only that the Reservation had been opened for non-Indian settlement, which is not disputed. South Dakota also points out a reference to the "former Sisseton Indian Reservation" in *United States* v. *Rickert*, *supra*, 188 U.S. at 432 (see DeCoteau, Resp. Br. 173). That phrase, however, is not the Court's but part of a quotation from the pleadings below as recited in the question certified to the Court. Reservation boundaries were not at issue and the use of the phrase must be considered in light of its limited meaning at the time.

b. Congress, since the opening of the Reservation, has continued to appropriate funds for the Sisseton-Wahpeton Reservation or Agency[9] and has never referred to the Reservation as a "former reservation," as it did with the reservations recognized by this Court as continuing to exist in *Seymour* v. *Superintendent, supra*, 368 U.S. at 356, n. 12, and *Mattz* v. *Arnett, supra*, 412 U.S. at 496, n. 17. This consistent appropriation process is a significant exercise of trust responsibility. Recently, moreover, Congress has unmistakenly reaffirmed its view that the opening of the surplus lands to non-Indian settlement did not terminate or diminish the Reservation (Public Law 93–489 and Public Law 93–491, signed by the President October 26, 1974). Indeed, in Public Law 93–489 Congress restored to "the United States in trust for the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe" certain federally owned land "of the Lake Traverse Indian Resevation in North and South Dakota." Since the land had not been trust land, this is a clear indication of the congressional understanding that the Reservation was never abolished and always included non-trust land. Similarly, Public Law 93–491 authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire lands:

> *within the boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation* * * * for the purpose of consolidating landholdings, eliminating fractional heir-

[9] See, for typical early appropriation language, 39 Stat. 988 and 42 Stat. 576. In recent years general appropriations have not been by particular reservation or agency. An extensive accounting of trust funds of the Tribe expended by the United States is available in General Services Administration Report, *The Lower Sioux Indian Community in Minnesota, et al.*, Docket No. 363 (June 1967) before the Indian Claims Commission.

> ship interests in Indian trust lands, providing land for any tribal program for the improvement of the economy of the tribe and its members through the development of industry, recreational facilities, housing projects, and the general rehabilitation and enhancement of the total resource potential *of the reservation.* [Emphasis added.]

It further authorizes the Tribe to sell tribal property and, from the proceeds, purchase *"other land on the reservation."* Again, we have a recognition of the Reservation's existence beyond trust lands and its continued service as the home and political jurisdiction of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe. While these recent Acts are not determinative of an earlier congressional intent, they are consistent only with the continuity of the Reservation's original boundaries and should be given weight. See *Seymour* v. *Superintendent, supra,* 368 U.S. at 356.

III

THE TRIBE'S INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT, CONFIRMED IN THE TREATY OF FEBRUARY 19, 1867, AND THE PRACTICALITIES OF PERFORMING THE CONTINUING TRUST RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE TRIBE SUPPORT THE INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT OF 1891 AS NOT DIMINISHING THE RESERVATION

We have discussed the jurisdiction of the State within the borders of the Lake Traverse Reservation primarily in terms of the precise wording of the statute opening the Reservation for non-Indian settlement. But the alleged ambiguity of the Act of 1891 and of similar Acts opening reservations also calls for a broader approach.

We note, first, that the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe remains an important and populous Indian tribe exercising its federally guaranteed powers of self-government under federal guardianship. A large amount of land, scattered about within the boundaries of the Reservation, remains trust land. The State of South Dakota did not choose to assume responsibility for civil and criminal law and law enforcement within Indian country in the state when it could have done so under Public Law 280, *supra.* Compare *Williams* v. *Lee,* 358 U.S. 217, 222–223; *McClanahan* v. *Arizona State Tax Commission,* 411 U.S. 164, 177–178. Nor is the decision that the State asks of this Court one that could give the State jurisdiction over acts occurring on trust land. Instead, the result sought by the state would greatly increase the difficulty of achieving adequate law and order on the reservation by requiring plat-book jurisdiction—state jurisdiction over Indians on this lot, federal or tribal jurisdiction on the next. Obviously, such an absurd result, in a reservation such as this, where a large Indian population lives, ought to be avoided, if possible.

Also, and equally important, it is, and has been, the policy of the United States that, unless specifically terminated by Congress, Indian tribes are self-governing political communities. In *McClanahan* v. *Arizona State Tax Commission, supra,* 411 U.S. at 168, this Court stated:

> • • • "[t]he policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history." *Rice* v. *Olson,* 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945). This policy was first

> articulated by this Court 141 years ago when Mr. Chief Justice Marshall held that Indian nations were "distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive * * *."

See also *Williams* v. *Lee, supra,* 358 U.S. at 220:

> Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.

This right to self-government was explicitly guaranteed the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe in its 1867 Treaty with the United States and has never been taken away by Congress. Article 10 of that Treaty states (DeCoteau, Pet. Br. App. 6):

> The chiefs and head-men located upon either of the reservations set apart for said bands are authorized to adopt such rules, regulations, or laws for the security of life and property, the advancement of civilization, and the agricultural prosperity of the members of said bands upon the respective reservations, and shall have authority, under the direction of the agent, and without expense to the Government, to organize a force sufficient to carry out all such rules, regulations, or laws, and all rules and regulations for the government of said Indians * * *.

Tribal control over domestic relations, at issue in *DeCoteau,* is at the heart of this right of Tribal self-government. See, *e.g., United States* v. *Quiver,* 241 U.S. 602, 603–604. The question of a child's welfare cannot be decided without reference to his family

structure. This involves both a sympathetic knowledge of the individuals involved, and a knowledge of the background culture. No matter how well-intentioned, state authorities are not likely to have insight into these important areas. Moreover, if such authorities are to have jurisdiction over tribal children in dependency and neglect cases, there is a substantial chance that such children may be placed in non-Indian homes outside the Reservation and be deprived of their cultural identity.[19] The Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe opposed such practices in a tribal resolution on July 6, 1972, which states:

> SISSETON-WAHPETON SIOUX
>
> WHEREAS, The Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe is interested in the well-being of all the enrolled members of the tribe and
>
> WHEREAS, Minor children of Sisseton-Wahpeton descent have been placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes all over the United States.
>
> WHEREAS, The tribal council is in the process of researching the sovereign status of the tribal entity in respect to its jurisdiction as stated in

[19] This concern, in the light of present experience, was strongly expressed by the North American Indian Women's Association in a recent report. North American Indian Women's Association, Inc., *Project Report for Development of a Prototype Program for Indian Children with Special Needs,* BIA Contract No. K51C14200761, December 15, 1973. The first recommendation made by the study was that "[W]hen at all possible, Indian Children should be placed with Indian foster parents." *Id.* at 62.

the constitution of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, and,

WHEREAS, It is the intent of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe to establish its own method of social and economic development and well-being of the enrolled members, and,

WHEREAS, It is the strong feeling of the tribal council to "make every stand possible to keep these children on the reservation" (minutes of June 6th council meeting) and "the tribal council would like these children to be placed in an Indian licensed home until an Indian home can be found for them to be adopted."

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that Mr. Bert Hirsch, legal counsel from the Association of American Indian Affairs, will stand on these grounds in his argument in Roberts County Court on July 7, 1972 and future cases of this nature.

The Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe is a responsible body, concerned about its young people. It should have authority over dependency and neglect and similar proceedings concerning its own people anywhere within the Reservation.[11] If this authority were fragmented so as to apply only to acts committed on trust land within the Reservation, it would be practically meaningless as an exercise of effective self-government. And neither the Tribe, in domestic relations matters and with respect to the criminal offenses left to its control, nor the United States, in its control over major crime, should have to search the tract books in

[11] The Tribe has assumed such authority under its tribal code.

order to determine whether it or the State has jurisdiction. *Seymour* v. *Superintendent, supra,* 368 U.S. at 358.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota should be reversed and the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

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Diagram of

LAKE TRAVERSE RESERVATION SHOWING TRUST AND TRIBAL LANDS







TRUST AND TRIBALLY HELD LANDS SHOWN IN RED (EXTRACTED FROM LAND OWNERSHIP MAP OF SISSETON INDIAN RESERVATION, STATUS AS OF 4-3-74).